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Abstract Australia is home to the biggest light rail net-
work and the industry is currently undergoing a renais-
sance. However, there is littleresearch to indicate the extent
to which well-informed human factors and ergonomics
practises are being incorporated into tram cab design. A
lack of standardised features may create transfer conflicts
between cabs, as well as operational issues and concerns
for occupational health. The aim of this paper is to improve
our understanding of the socio-technical complexity of
light rail and to enhance how design standards are informed
in this domain. Various human factors methods were used,
including observational cab rides, objective force assess-
ments, interviews, and focus groups. Data were collected
across two sites and analysed thematically. Analysis of data
suggested a substandard level human factors and ergo-
nomics input in the design of the cab and driver interface
that violated many key tenets of established design
guidelines. These were particularly concerned with the
usability of the master controller (i.e. throttle lever) and
various issues in the design of the tram driver workspace.
Findings also revealed a number of subtle yet significant
features associated with delivery of service that created
safety-performance conflicts. In conclusion, very little
human factors input of tram driving, and the ergonomics
considerations of the driver’s workplace in general, appear
to be going into the design of tram cabs. This may be
related to the practice of using non-specific standards for
developing trams and/or poorly integrating human factors
and ergonomics into their specification processes. Some
considerations for future work are given.
Keywords Modern tram  Traffic and transport safety 
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1 Background
Australia has over 270 km of tramway and is home to the
biggest and oldest urban light rail network in the world [1].
There are also signs that the Australian light rail industry is
undergoing a renaissance; new light rail projects are being
planned, are under construction, or currently operational in
Melbourne, Adelaide, Canberra, Perth, Newcastle, Sydney,
and the Gold Coast [2, 3].
Much of the published literature on Australian Trams
has tended to explore its history, growth, and design,
specifically in terms of its engineering [e.g. 1, 4]. Mar-
keting brochures for modern trams typically advertise
innovations in technology, including advanced bogie
designs, provision of passenger amenities, and modularised
car-body components for collision safety and ease of repair
[5]. Some emerging classes have also won design awards
[6]; however, very little published research indicates the
extent to which good ergonomics and human factors (E/
HF) principles have been incorporated into the design of
tram cabs. This space typically falls into the design and
consultation space of rail manufacturing companies that
service the industry. In recent years, the absence of this has
been made apparent by its coverage in the media spotlight
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for reports of work-related injury and stress reducing the
drivers’ ability to work [7].
Beyond occupational health and safety concerns, there
are a number of reasons why the tram system would be
important from an E/HF perspective. First, many tram
classes operate in Australia’s individual states and
increasing the number of classes of trams on a single net-
work invariably decreases the range of standardised fea-
tures. This has the effect of creating inconsistencies in
stimulus–response design and may lead to conflicts when
transferring between different trams [8], particularly if
there has been no consideration to matching and/or retro-
fitting frequently used features. Additionally, the lack of
standardisation may create variations in the design of the
cab interface and impact on driving performance. For
example, injuries associated with passengers falling in the
saloon are among the most common safety issue [9] and
linked with concerns for jerky driving [10]. Whilst some of
these issues may be related to human performance and
training, it is worth questioning the extent to which they are
influenced by problems in tram cab design.
Most of the functional requirements for designing the
driver–cab of a tram appear to have been extracted from
standards originally written for generic locomotives and
driving coaches [e.g. 11]. Although the tram and train
driving tasks have synergies, heavy, and light rail are
fundamentally different systems, and the resulting designs
may not always be suitable. The operation of trams in
mixed-road traffic environments (i.e. as streetcars or street
moving vehicles) stretches this gap further. Theories that
orientate towards systems design such as the joint-cogni-
tive systems movement suggests that drivers are likely to
have a very unique dynamic with their vehicles, and an
inter-connectedness that means they operate with it as an
intimate system [12]. Based on this notion, one may
assume that any differences in the features and character-
istics of the two environments are likely to create subtle but
significant differences in task dynamics. This is one of the
reasons why it is important to involve the end-user in
participative design processes, so as to ensure that the
system, interface and the task work and behave as intended
[13].
Norman’s six design principles, which still underpin
thinking around good design theory, are based on visibility,
feedback, affordance, mapping, constraint, and consistency
[14, 15]. In terms of tram cab design, these can be con-
sidered to correspond with: whether drivers can see the
state of the tram, and if controls are positioned in a way
that can be easily found and used (visibility); whether
drivers know tram state, what it is doing, and what action
needs to be performed (feedback); whether the perceived
and actual properties of the various control and functions of
the tram clearly elucidate their operation (affordance);
whether there is a clear relationship with controls and their
effect (mapping); whether there are any clear restrictions to
the kind of interactions that can take place (constraints);
whether cab-interfaces are designed to have similar oper-
ations; and whether systems are learnable and drivers can
quickly transfer prior knowledge to new contexts (consis-
tency). One would not expect many of these tenets to be
violated or substantially compromised in the design of
modern trams.
Industrial ergonomics literature has identified E/HF
issues in the design of tram cabs and suggested improve-
ments, particularly for the primary speed/brake throttle
controller (also known as the master controller), and
‘‘deadman’’ safety features (i.e. safety devices that operate
if the driver is incapacitated) [16]. The general expectation
is that once cab design issues have been identified,
improvements will filter back into the specifications during
the tendering and bidding process for new rolling stock
classes. However, there are few publically accessible ways
of tracking how, when, and if this happens. In general, new
knowledge or insights are also expected to inform stan-
dards, but this process does not always translate either.
1.1 Aims
The aim of the research presented into this paper is to
improve our understanding of the socio-technical com-
plexity of light rail, and how design standards are informed
in this domain. To fulfil the aims of this research, the
objective of this paper is to draw on established design
theory [14] to provide an account of the key E/HF issues in
cab and task design that have been observed in the Aus-
tralian tram industry. Whilst we share insights that would
be of interest to the academic community, our goal is to
provide a platform for debate and discussion for academic
and industry practitioners, particularly those within the
engineering urban rail transit community.
2 Method
2.1 Research Context
The research reported in this article was undertaken at two
different sites (i.e. two different light rail networks) in
Australia. The work was initiated by tram operators in
response to complaints and concerns provided by tram
drivers. In one site, this followed a very high incidence of
musculo-skeletal injuries with particular incidence of left
shoulder/arm injuries, and in other, through reports of cab
design issues in the driver–cabs of newly deployed rolling
stock.
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2.2 Design
Several methods were converged to evaluate and assess the
workplace of the tram driver. These fell into a mainstream
range of qualitative techniques that are commonly used to
evaluate humans at work, and included cab walkthroughs
on stationary trams, on-road observations on scheduled
services, objective force assessments, interviews, and focus
groups.
Converging multiple data collecting techniques has been
recommended as an effective means of eliciting knowledge
[17] and performed successfully on other rail research [e.g.
18, 19]. Undertaking the work in different sites provided
the means to compare common issues across different tram
classes and identify the scope of specific E/HF problems.
The methodology also included a specific physical ergo-
nomics assessment and a broader human factors investi-
gation. Figure 1 shows an overview of the methodology for
each of these components, including individual methods of
data collection and the main areas of focus. As Fig. 1
shows, unstructured interviews, cab walkthroughs, and cab
rides were common to both components.
The physical ergonomics work assessed the driver’s
interaction with their cab in terms of how the interface
fitted their body and addressed their functional needs.
Methods in this component included unstructured inter-
views, cab walkthroughs (on stationary trams), and cab
rides. Unstructured interviews were conducted with groups
of drivers in the tram depot, or entirely opportunistically
with individual drivers during cab walkthroughs and cab
rides. Cab walkthroughs were pre-planned and involved a
detailed discussion of the cab with a driver trainer who
‘‘walked’’ through the layout of the various controls,
described their functions, and demonstrated how they were
operated. The process lasted 30–60 min. Responses to
questions were voice recorded, and photos were taken.
During the walkthroughs, cabs were also assessed in terms
of the push–pull forces and static muscle load required to
operate controls. Particular focus was placed on the master
controller and ‘‘deadman’’ devices, and measurements
were taken using a Mecmesin force gauge. Cab rides were
pre-planned ‘‘out and back’’ journeys from the main depot,
undertaken during scheduled services (i.e. with passengers)
but also out of service. These lasted 30–120 min and
included spells of interviewing and silent observation of
the driver engaging with their task.
The human factors work examined the driver–cab in
terms of the design of the tram-driving task itself and its
cognitive demands. The methods in this component also
included cab walkthroughs, driving observations, and
unstructured interviews, and these were undertaken as
previously described. However, this component also
included a series of focus groups. These lasted 1.5–2 h,
conducted with 4–6 tram drivers per group, and included a
scenario simulation task [20]. This task required each of
the participants to create challenging driving scenarios, as a
means to overcome conversation-based limitation, but also
stimulate situational insight. These methods has been pre-
viously applied in the heavy rail industry and have been
very effective for identifying specific cognitive task
demands, and illustrating how driver’s stabilise the task in
the face of conflicting goals [20]. Example questions for
the general focus group were ‘‘What are your thoughts on
the [specific class] tram?’’ and ‘‘take me through a chal-
lenging part of a route that you drive over.’’ Example
questions for the scenario simulation task were ‘‘create a
really hard stretch of track’’ and ‘‘imagine you have to
drive over your route. List the strategies that you would use
to navigate it.’’
2.3 Participants and Recruitment
Participants provided informed consent to take part in the
work, but in all cases, contacts at the relevant organisations
were required to mediate and facilitate access. Whilst most
activities were pre-planned, given the nature of the field-
work, this was subject to change.
2.4 Data Collection Decomposition
Our work comprised assessment of two specific tram-types
from two different rail manufacturing companies servicing
the industry. Our assessments were related to prior inci-
dence of musculo-skeletal injury in one tram, and a con-
cern for the skills transfer issues in the other. In both cases,
issues were first raised and reported by tram drivers. A
further four tram classes were observed in order to create a
basis for cross-comparison, making six tram classes in
total. As two of these classes comprised observations of an
earlier and later model (of the same class), eight different
trams were actually observed across both of the sites.
Figure 2 decomposes the data collection in each of the
sites by showing the number and duration of each of the
methods and the number of drivers that took part. Six cab
rides with a total of 7 h of observation were performed. The
unstructured interviews were undertaken with 10 drivers. As
shown in Fig. 2, the physical ergonomics assessment was
only performed at one site, though this was on two tram
classes common to both. The focus groups were also
undertaken in one site, though this was the larger network of
the two with a much greater variety of tram types.
2.5 Data Analysis
Like the E/HF methods used to collect data, the analysis
was largely qualitative. For the ergonomics assessment,
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the impact of the controls on postural and muscle fatigue
was evaluated by analysing the objective force assess-
ments in 3-dimensional static strength modelling soft-
ware. Further, the organisations’ own statistics associated
with the history of injury in the use of their trams was
reviewed and the physical loads in relation to injury
causing factors were examined. These assessments iden-
tified target areas for changes to the physical cab. For the
human factors work, data from the focus groups and
informal interviews was transcribed and analysed with a
number of techniques. Consistent with the aims of the
research and scope of this paper, we report specifically on
results that were identified through a process of thematic
analysis applied to data from both the ergonomics and
human factors components. This is in order to generate
clear themes that meet the aims of the research and fulfil
the objectives of the paper.
The themes and conceptual groupings were derived
from phrases and comments from the transcripts, which
grounded the findings in the data [21]. The initial findings
were refined into overarching groupings and discussed to
reach agreement on the codes that were used. This analysis
was undertaken in multiple rounds and included a process
of constant comparative analysis and cross-data validity
check to determine consistency of the analysis and allow
for further refining [22, 23, 24]. To achieve this, the data
were checked regularly against other sources, such as
photos of different cab designs from the various classes,
scenarios from the focus groups, and injury statistics. The
groupings and emerging themes were then checked with
subject matter experts and tram drivers (i.e. end-users) in
the participating organisations [25, 26].
3 Results
Before presenting findings from the thematic analyses, we
will set the context by briefly describing our observations
of the driver–tram system in terms of the type of cognitive
work involved in the task. After this, we will provide three
themes that appeared to evidence very little specification of
E/HF considerations in the design of the cab for human use.
Fig. 1 Overview of the
methodology
Fig. 2 Decomposition of
activities in each of the data
collection sites
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The themes comprised design considerations associated
with the cab, the driver–cab interface, and the task.
3.1 The Driver–Tram System
The driver and the tram operated in a transportation system
that was expressed in terms of how well-traffic moved.
There were signals, signs, points (i.e. switches that selected
the route), and rules of the road, all of which defined issues
of flow and required technical knowledge. Most of the
observed trams served as a streetcar in the main; that is,
they moved on the road with adjoining vehicles but also on
their own rail corridors (i.e. a dedicated light rail corridor
section). Some sections of track necessarily had less tram
and road vehicle separation, largely as a result of increased
passenger densities. The task of tram driving itself was
observed to have a number of distinct features. First, it was
highly dynamic, both in terms of the number and frequency
of tasks needing to be performed. The consensus from
participants was that they performed three core tasks: (1)
preparing the tram so it was safe before starting the shift;
(2) ensuring a smooth journey; and (3) providing good
customer service within the time constraints. These goals
were closely coupled and expertise was characterised by
the ability to regulate them well. Trams could move too
fast or too slow with little effort, meaning that they could
encroach easily beyond points of no return with relative
ease. This included road cross hatchings representing ‘‘no
mans land’’ with little clearance for turning trams, going
through red lights into road traffic, or driving over points
that were set incorrectly.
The complexity in the task was defined by the goals of
comfort (braking and accelerating smoothly), time-accu-
racy (maintaining the stopping pattern), and regulating
speeds effectively. Thus, the task incorporated an autono-
mously driven process on two dimensions: first, the driver
controlled the acceleration and braking of the tram, not the
speed itself; and second, there was a time requirement to
meet with service delivery imposed at higher levels.
Analysis of the task revealed six main subtasks, each of
which was directly related with one or more of the three
overarching goals. These are shown in Fig. 3. All but one
(vigilance of the road and its users) was directly related to
the three core tasks.
Throttle and braking was complex and drivers needed to
accurately estimate the influence of gradients and changing
conditions on speed in order to do it efficiently. Tram
handling was subject to variation as a result of changes to
wheel adhesion brought on by changes in weather. Whilst
drivers could deploy sand to improve adhesion, some slip-
inducing agents were not always visible (e.g. millipedes).
Thus, much like train driving, tram drivers spoke of driving
by the ‘‘feel of the tram’’ and by ‘‘instinct’’ highlighting the
role of non-technical skills. The driver in the driver–tram
system needed to be attentive, vigilant, and remain highly
aware of the environment as it evolved around them. They
also needed to think and react very quickly, but as a human,
they were susceptible to fatigue and psychological impacts
associated with shift work. It was also easy to get distracted
by sources related to the task, such as time pressure, as well
as non-task-related sources, such as passenger chatter. The
final element of the system were the goals that informed
decision-making processes. The driver needed to regulate
safety against productivity, but in practice, pressures and
other motivations influenced this process. Cultural norms
within the organisation and environment (e.g. road-user
behaviour), and other social influences meant that the way
a driver operated a tram in one site was likely to be very
different from another.
3.2 Cab Design: Confusion Hath Now Made his
Masterpiece1
Multiple classes and types of tram operated on the net-
works represented by both sites. Numerous differences in
cab design were observed for trams operating on the same
network, attracting potential for conflicts when moving
between cabs. In one tram for example, sounds were easily
masked by other alarms. In another tram (on the same
network), the alarms were very loud, such that they fre-
quently ‘‘startled’’ the driver. For example, participants
considered the buzzer associated with vigilance checks on
one tram to be overly loud, stress inducing, and resonate in
the ears long after it had gone. These issues illustrated
problems in the design of auditory icons, inappropriate
urgency and hazard matching of cab alarms, and ulti-
mately, design issues with external consistency. Although
the perception of sound was based on subjective assess-
ment, they appeared to contravene recommended noise
design levels (i.e. no greater than 85 dB(A) for any length
of time and 15–25 dB(A) above this) for alarms [27].
Problem or difficulties with inconsistency are usually a
result of different systems rarely observing the same design
standards [14].
Issues were also observed with the design and placement
of buttons, such that participants confused some of them
during walkthroughs. Figure 4 shows a tram cab where
eight buttons were integrated into the armrest of the driver
seat. The buttons showed very low discrimination in
design—that is, they were identical to feel and touch,
which increased head-down activity during driving. They
also had no backlighting, which created problems in low
light/night driving. To overcome this, some drivers indi-
cated that they ‘‘pulsed the [cab] light’’ to improve
1 Shakespeare, W. (In 2.3. Macbeth).
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visibility whilst others used a torch. Both of these strategies
increased task loading, but the problem was exacerbated by
light reflecting off the windscreen, which restricted visi-
bility even further. Generally speaking, there was no
common design language in the quantity and clustering of
buttons. In focus groups, few participants who operated this
tram were able to recall the exact location and position of
buttons, though some indicated that cab designers had
consulted a small reference group of tram drivers as part of
the design process. The categories of findings in the cab
design theme reflected several departures from Norman’s
[14] design principles, particularly with visibility, feed-
back, mapping, constraints, and consistency.
3.3 Interface Design: Action is Eloquence2
The master controller was the primary means of controlling
the tram and integrated throttle and braking commands into
a single lever. These were mapped to the direction of travel
(i.e. moving the master controller forward moved the tram
forward). Participants described a process of working with
the master controller to understand how throttle manipu-
lations influenced tram speed. This was a non-technical
skill and descriptions supported the joint-cognitive systems
view [12]. The master controller is ultimately associated
with the safety function of ensuring a smooth passenger
journey task and subtask, as shown in Fig. 3. The problems
observed with the master controller fell into a number of
categories and included designs with low correspondence
between body and arm posture, variation in reach dis-
tances, and forearm pads that did not facilitate contact with
all master controller notch positions. For example, the
master controller in Fig. 4 was integrated into the right-arm
of the driver seat and could only be adjusted by pivoting
the armrest up or down at the point it joined the rear of the
chair. The way that master controller movements graduated
with accelerating and braking also varied between trams,
within and between the two sites. Predicting changes in
tram speed was therefore less reliable and reported as a
contributing factor to work-related stress.
Some master controller designs required application of
sustained push force via spring-loading; that is, they were
designed to fall back into the brake position if the driver
were to let go (i.e. a ‘‘deadman’’ device). One master
controller required a static force exertion that exceeded the
recommended duration, and as such, was considered to be
the main cause for incidence of musculo-skeletal injuries in
that tram. During cab rides, we observed frequent changes
in the hand positions of participants who operated this type
of master controller (see Fig. 5). The same drivers did not
show these in conscious demonstrations, suggesting that
the process occurred enactively [28] (i.e. operated outside
of conscious awareness), likely as a strategy to distribute
physical loading and fatigue across different muscle
groups.
Most rail-based systems use features that perform reg-
ular ‘‘vigilance’’ checks. According to standards for gen-
eric locomotives and driving coaches, these devices must
be capable of stopping the tram in the event that the driver
is incapacitated [11]. For this reason, they are usually
designed with a contact-point (e.g. a button) that requires
frequent contact; the idea being that it acts as a safety
measure in the event of physiological breakdown (e.g. from
malaise, sleep). In one tram, the maximum holding time for
one of these devices was 12 s with 3 s for maximum
release. Thus, if the driver held down the button for more
than 12 s (without carrying out an action) or released it for
longer than 2 s, a buzzer sounded after which the driver
had 2 s to carry out an action to prevent the emergency
brakes from activating.
The timing given to respond to these devices varied for
different trams, between and within the two sites, meaning
that the driver had much longer to respond to the device in
one type of cab than in another. The mechanism used to
Fig. 3 Overview of the six
subtasks associated with three
core tasks in tram driving
2 Shakespeare, W. (In 3.2. Coriolanus).
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reset the device also varied. In some it was a foot pedal, in
others, a sensitive thumb button/contact, and others had
both. In some trams, the driver could not swap between the
thumb and foot even though cab design indicated this
possibility. In one tram, the system required drivers to
touch a sensor on the master controller with their thumb,
but it was reported to have poor responsiveness. During cab
rides, it was observed being tapped and swiped, or stroked
regularly in clockwise and counter-clockwise motions.
This behaviour increased task loading, but also appeared to
be a habituated process used to overcompensate for the
warning noise (see Cab design theme) and prevent it from
Fig. 4 Buttons that have been
integrated into the armrest of the
cab. Left photo shows whole
seat with buttons (circled); right
photo shows a close-up
Fig. 5 Matrix of photos
showing examples of variation
in hand positions observed
when operating a master
controller that required
sustained push force
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sounding. Analysis from the interface design theme iden-
tified a number of departures from Norman’s design prin-
ciples [14], namely, feedback, mapping, and consistency.
3.4 Task Design: Time is Out of Joint3
Tram driving requires the drivers to wrestle between safety
and productivity goals. For some drivers, this generated
time pressure. Although this was considered a norm for the
task, the experience was intensified by the design of the
vigilance task. The focus on time had the effect of taking
attention away from other tasks, such as stopping the tram
smoothly, opening and closing doors efficiently, and con-
firming that passengers were getting on and off safely.
Further, the design of the task reflected these tensions; as
an example, the doors on the trams had sensors, which
prevented them from being closed if they were obstructed
(e.g. by a person, bag, push-chair). However, the trams also
had a force-door close button, which could override the
passenger detection sensors and close the door. Many dri-
vers confessed to using this button over the regular door
close button, in spite of organisational policy.
In newer trams, drivers were presented with a digital
time-keeping performance indicator in their interface to
show how fast or slow they were moving between stops.
This information was updated in real time as a pseudo-
estimated time of arrival or ETA feature. Indeed, some
participants were observed using these changes in time to
regulate the master controller (and therefore tram speed)
instead of the information displayed in the speedometer.
Thus for some drivers, the time shown in this device was
being used to parameterise their speed choices instead of
the speeds on the road. Performance penalties for the tram
industry were reportedly associated with being too early
than for being too late. This was not surprising, given the
focus on maintaining flow and minimising impact to other
services. At one site, penalties were administered if the
driver was more than 1-min early or more than 6-min’s
late. This was considered to create a ‘‘hurry up and wait
culture,’’ which emphasised time keeping and anxiety from
lack of control in work pacing. This effect is supported by
observations in the train system when station dwelling [20],
but is of particular concern in the tram context, given that
time pressure has been associated with negative emotions,
stress, and the increased propensity for risk taking beha-
viours on roads [23, 29]. The theme of task design revealed
a number of breaks from Norman’s design principles,
namely affordance (i.e. using changes in time from the
ETA feature to change speed), mapping, and constraints.
4 Discussion
The E/HF issues we observed suggested to us that the
standards being used to inform the design of older trams, as
well as newer ones, may not have been specified well
enough for the socio-technical complexity in the system.
This was clearly evidenced in the three themes where there
were multiple departures and compromises in good-prac-
tice design [14]. Most of the trams we observed were
modern trams, one of which was undergoing commis-
sioning and acceptance at the time of the research. Thus,
they suggested that whilst standards were adequately
specified, the process of consultation and end-user design
was lacking. They may also have pointed to problems in
translating standards into practice. The lack of involvement
from E/HF designers and/or good E/HF practises in the
design of the trams, particularly in their early stages, is
likely to be a contributing factor. However, as designers,
managers, and suppliers involved in the tram procurement
process were not interviewed as part of the work, this is
difficult to substantiate. If these issues are indeed part of
the problem, it is important to note that inviting the authors
to conduct these assessments is a sign of change. Partici-
pants indicated that tram drivers (i.e. end-users) had actu-
ally been consulted during the early part of the design
process—particularly with respect to data presented in the
theme of cab design, and there was consensus to support
this. However, given the observed issues with the resulting
design (e.g. placement of buttons in the driver seat), the
process is likely to have occurred at the cost of expert E/HF
input—that is, the tram drivers could have been consulted
under the premise that they were experts in design as well
as experts in tram driving.
Many of our observations and findings pointed to
important and relevant concerns of the impacts of cab
design on work and stress, but there were also data to
support this from the perspective of task design. There
were strong indications that participants experienced time
pressure and anxiety associated with regulating safety
goals, such as driving smoothly, letting passengers on and
off efficiently, and with their productivity goals, such as
keeping to the schedule. These tensions may filter through
to the task in the form of suboptimal (i.e. jerky) journeys,
and door opening issues; therefore it is useful to monitor
these events as a measure for risk. Key observations for
E/HF communities, and standards design authorities were
as follows:
• Inefficiencies or issues in vigilance device for the cab,
interface, and task design spectrum
• Distraction and inattention to the tram-driving task
from time pressure and over-emphasis on productivity
goals3 Shakespeare, W. (In 1.5. Hamlet).
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• Inordinately high forces required to operate the master
controller
• Lack of forearm support when operating the master
controller
• Inconsistencies in noise, particularly for auditory
alarms
• Difficulties for operators to achieve the correct posture
due to a combination of poor seating adjustments and
console/cabin design.
4.1 Methodological Review
Human Factors integration is concerned with ‘‘providing a
balanced development of both the technical and human
aspects of equipment procurement’’ and essentially ‘‘en-
sures the application of scientific knowledge about human
characteristics through the specification, design and eval-
uation of systems.’’ [30, p. 6] The key advantage of the
methodology used in this paper is that it was driven by a
multidisciplinary approach, combining the expertise of
mechanical engineers, human factors specialists, and
ergonomists.
The methods that were used in the study substantially
increased the ability for the investigators to understand the
problems. A combination of discussions, generative simu-
lation tasks, and observations of enactive behaviours on-
and off-the-job enabled the participants to more easily
describe their own knowledge and thought processes, but
also overcame the problem of any inaccuracies of self-
reporting from memory and decision processes [31]. As a
qualitative process, the study provided a richness and
depth, particularly given the integration of objective force
assessments. However, the methods could be further
strengthened by the addition of suitable quantitative
methods (e.g. national surveys, simulator work).
4.2 Further Research
For the rail industry, considerations into the redesign of
seating, the master controller, and the foot pedal are
advocated to achieve more flexibility and correct posture
for tram drivers when driving. Work is currently being
undertaken in one site involving cab design modifications
to determine optimum driver interface with the master
controller and foot pedal based on the findings to date
with the aid of mock-ups. This will be the subject of
further reporting when the testing is completed. Further
academic research should also consider the specific make-
up of the tram-driving task using task analyses. Towards
achieving this aim, more analysis of the data collected in
this work may be used to develop a framework for further
analysis, specifically in terms of how the task demands
interact with the specific ergonomic and human factors
issues.
The findings evidence a general need to investigate any
strategies for reducing risk-related stress in this population.
This may start by examining the informal strategies to
manage and mitigate stress associated with safety risk and
performance conflicts. Lastly, it would be useful undertake
more work to determine if and how suggested improve-
ment in cab ergonomics filter back into tram classes when
specifying bids, tenders, and contracts for new rolling
stock.
5 Conclusions
A combination of physical ergonomics assessments and
human factors investigations identified issues with design
and tram operation in two sites in Australia. The findings
suggest a dearth of ergonomics and human factors con-
siderations of the design of the driver interface and the cab.
This may be related to the practice of using non-specific
standards for developing trams and/or poorly integrating
human factors into their specification processes.
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